Opinions from some westerners conclude that what motivates Beijing to support Myanmar is economic interest, and yet others think it is out of Beijing's fear of democracy. Some experts in China defended the government with seemingly correct reasons—in principle Beijing does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and really doesn't possess the kind of powerful influence the outside imagines; it is correct that Beijing chooses to be silent on the situation in Myanmar.
As a matter of fact, if one doesn't purposely pretend to be confused, it becomes apparent that the support Beijing has for Myanmar is completely for its own political interest.
First, China and Myanmar are both addicted to violent dictatorship. The difference is civil officials are in charge of the government in China, whereas in Myanmar, after the political revolution in 1962, entered the military government period.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) formed a military government when it took power in China. All successive movements, including the Anti-revolutionary movement and the Land Reform Act that killed tens of millions of people, had been rationalized into acts of justice by officials. In reality, hadn't Beijing always suppressed groups with military force and caused the deaths of many? Myanmar's government suppression is child's play compared to what the CCP has done and it's nothing but a price to pay to sustain stability. In addition, the CCP regime is as highly corrupted as Myanmar's except the CCP is more experienced. In Myanmar information leaked out to already angry citizens that the daughter of General Than Shwe was given US$50 million on her marriage. In China, the private lives of high-level officials is kept a state secret.
Second, Beijing wouldn't want to see any damage done to the league of dictators. Since the time of Mao Zedong, China has been trying to export to neighboring countries its revolutionary ideas to build a league of dictators to fight against western political infiltration and "peaceful evolution." These neighboring countries paid a miserable price for these ideas from the CCP, and their miserable histories belong to the "state secrets" in China and remain unknown to most Chinese people. The league of dictators has greatly diminished and left China few friends like North Korea and Myanmar. In order to stay in power, it became necessary for Beijing to support its ally, the Myanmar government.
Third, China favors Myanmar geographically. In recent years, Beijing has been attracting support from southeastern Asian countries through regional organizations such as the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations. Beijing has spent most money in Myanmar among all other southeastern Asian countries. Beijing has supported the current Myanmar government since it came to power in 1988 by providing over US$2 billion for its military, several billion U.S. dollars in economic support, including basic infrastructures and various training.
For these reasons, in January of this year, Beijing, together with Russia and South Africa, vetoed to sanction Myanmar at the U.N. After this, the military junta's actions were further encouraged.
As much as the international community renounced Beijing's vote at the U.N., Beijing proudly hung this "medal" on its chest and told its people that it is the hero against "western empires" and the savior of a third world country. All media played the clip of China's U.N. representative Wang Guangya raising his right hand to say "No" to western countries and how grateful Myanmar government is for Beijing's support. Beijing can see its own future in this current situation in Myanmar and the possible isolation as the voice of international condemnation.
It's not hard for Chinese people to see what roll Beijing plays on the international stage. Just remember old sayings like "birds of a feather flock together" and "A man is known by the company he keeps" and it won't be hard to tell what kind of regime befriends Kim Jong-Il from North Korea and the Myanmar government.
第 一，兔死狐悲，物伤其类。一方面，从政治体制上看，中国与缅甸属于迷恋暴力的专制同类，区别在于中国的专制政府目前还是文官当家，而缅甸则早在1962年 奈温将军发动政变后就进入了凭枪杆子说话的军政时期──军政时期中国历史上曾多次出现，北洋军阀时期与共产党执政初期都是军政时期，只是共产党执政初期的 那杀人如麻的镇反、土改均被官方宣传成正义行动而已。而现实中国其实离军政府上台并无多远距离，每年那数万起群体性事件，不都是凭枪杆子镇压下去的吗？哪 一次事件不死几个人甚至几十个人？两相对比，缅甸军政府的镇压在中共心目中实在算不上什么暴行，只是为了“维持稳定”所必需要付出的代价而已。另一方面， 中国执政集团与缅甸执政集团都属于高度腐败类型，只不过中国的执政者相对富有统治经验，高干家庭的生活均列入“国家机密”，不会象缅甸那样，连军政府领袖 丹瑞之女携5,000万美元嫁妆出嫁那样的视频都被泄露出去，给鼎沸的民怨再浇上一桶油。
第二，唇亡齿寒，中国当局绝对不愿意看到专制防火 带再崩塌一角。从毛泽东时代开始，中国就一直试图通过“输出革命”在其周边构筑一条专制防火带，以对抗西方的政治渗透与“和平演变”。这些周边国家因中共 输出革命而付出的惨重代价，至今在中国还属于“国家机密”，是大多数中国人不知道也不想知道的。现在，经历过第三波民主化之后，这条专制防火带越来越狭 窄，仅剩下北韩、缅甸等寥寥几个国家。为免唇亡齿寒之虞，力挺缅甸军政府已经成了中国政府维持自身寿命所必需。
第三，缅甸还符合中国地缘政 治上的利益。近年来，中国一直都在通过东盟等区域性组织和双边关系在东南亚展开魅力攻势，在所有的东南亚国家中，中国在缅甸身上花的钱最多：从现任军政权 1988年执政以来，中国不仅向缅甸提供了据说价值超过20亿美元的军事装备，另外还提供了几十亿美元的经济援助，包括基础设施和培训方面的支持。
因 为上述三重原因，早在今年1月，中国在联合国大会上行使了否决权，与对美国推行“颜色革命”保持高度警惕的俄罗斯、南非等联合反对制裁缅甸，这一否决票大 大鼓励了缅甸统治者的为所欲为。尽管国际社会称中国这次投否决票“格外令人反感”，而中国当局却坦然将缅甸的感谢当作奖章挂在胸前，在国内大肆宣传自己又 当了一回“反美英雄”，又成了一回第三世界国家的救世主，如“中国驻联合国代表王光亚高举右手，对美英说‘不’，“类似‘新闻联播”的缅甸电视8点档新闻 中断正常播出节目，专门感谢中国等国家对缅甸的支持”。而今天的缅甸局势，更使中国当局不仅从中看到了中国的未来政治局势，也从今天国际社会的同声谴责中 看到了自己将来可能面临的孤立。